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Introduction
develop a monopolistic competition model with heterogeneous firms to show the effect of resource misallocation on aggregate productivity. Using data on establishments they find evidence of resource misallocation and consequent effects on aggregate total factor productivity (TFP) in China and India. This paper applies their methodology using Colombian industrial establishment data from the Annual Manufacturing Survey (AMS) from 1982 to 1998.
When misallocation of capital and labor across plants in Colombia is hypothetically changed to the level of the United States, Colombia's manufacturing TFP increases between 3 percent and 8 percent. These gains are small compared to 30-50 percent and 40-60 percent reported by Hsieh and Klenow for China and India, respectively.
Firm-level regressions show that Total Factor Productivity related to "physical productivity" 2 (TPFQ) is positively correlated with exporting status, age, size, and location in the central region of the country. When relating distortions to policy changes in Colombia, we show a positive correlation between TFPQ and labor sector reforms, but emphasize the need for further work to establish a causal relation. We hypothetically reallocate resources by equalizing Total
Factor Productivity related to "revenue productivity" (TFPR) across plants and within industries.
The aggregate TFP gains that would result are between 47-55 percent. When comparing actual firm size to the size observed if TFPR were equalized across plants and within industries, we find that Colombia should have fewer mid-size plants and more small and large ones. We conduct several robustness checks by varying the parameter of elasticity of substitution between plant value added and the source of the labor and output shares.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we provide background information on trade labor market and financial reforms that took place during the period we study. Section 3 describes the panel dataset used in the analysis and the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database used to calculate U.S. labor shares. Section 4 provides details about the methodology used to derive the empirical results. Section 5 starts with descriptive statistics, then provides the empirical findings with robustness checks, and ends with an assessment of the possibility of measurement error in the plant revenue and inputs variables.
Section 6 shows how TFPQ and TFPR relate to different firms' characteristics and to how their dispersion relates to the timing of trade and labor policies. Section 7 summarizes the main findings and concludes.
Background
During the early 1980s there were several reforms that increased effective protection. 3 Eslava et al. (2009) report that the average tariff level in 1984 was 27 percent, but there was variation across industries. In particular, they find that the average tariff protection in manufacturing rose to 50 percent during this period. Esguerra and Villar (2006) show that in 1985 the tariff schedule increased by 16 percent. During the second half of the 1980s there was a reduction in trade barriers, while trade liberalization reforms started in the first half of the 1990s. Trade reforms further reduced tariffs, resulting in effective protection rates falling from 62.5 percent to 26.6 percent between 1990 and 1991 (Edwards, 2001) . Between 1991 and 1992 the average tariff level was 11 percent (Ocampo and Villar, 1992) .
In 1991 a new Constitution gave independence to the Central Bank and introduced municipal decentralization. One of the most important reforms of that decade took place in 1993, when Law 100 amended the social security systems. This system went from pay-as-you-go to a fully-funded system with individual accounts, (see, e.g., Kugler and Kugler, 2009 ). The law also created a contributive health insurance regime, increasing contributions for health and pensions through employment by 10 percentage points from 1992 to 1996.
In the early 1990s Colombia started a broad process of economic and political reforms in areas including employment policies, social security, financial markets and trade. A main goal of the reforms was to achieve greater flexibility in the labor market. Law 50 of December 1990 modified severance payments savings accounts and reduced dismissal costs between 60 percent and 80 percent (see, e.g., Kugler, 1999 and 2005) . In the same year Law 45 eliminated interest rate ceilings and requirements to invest in government securities, while lowering reserve requirements. Additional financial sector reforms took place in 1991. First, Law 9 abolished exchange controls. Second, financial markets were reinforced according to the Basel Accords.
Finally, Resolution 49 eliminated restrictions on foreign direct investment (see, e.g., Kugler, 2006) . A result of these financial reforms was an increase in capital inflows, which benefited the economy as a whole and especially the financial sector.
3 See Garay (1998) 
Data

Annual Manufacturing Survey in Colombia 1982-1998
We use the panel created by Eslava et al. (2004) payments. Major differences in the original and updated panel correspond to the way deflators are constructed. We merge both panels using information that does not involve prices (4-digit level ISIC, production and non-production personnel, year, energy consumption). We use price indexes to reconstruct nominal output and materials, and subtract them to obtain nominal value added.
As documented by Eslava et al. (2004) , the plant capital stock is constructed recursively by depreciating the capital stock in the previous year and adding deflated investment. The deflator for investments calculated at the 3-digit ISIC code level corresponds to the implicit deflator for capital formation from the input-output matrices for 1991-94, and from the output utilization matrices for later years. Pombo (1999) 
Deriving the Results
Following Hsieh and Klenow (2009), we set the rental price of capital, R, to 10 percent and the elasticity of substitution between plant value added to 3. This value corresponds closely to denotes the firm and s denotes the industry, , are the capital distortions, or the distortions that increase the marginal product of capital relative to the marginal product of labor.
The production function of each firm i in sector s is Cobb-Douglas with constant returns to scale.
We set the elasticity of output with respect to capital in each industry, , as one minus the labor share in the corresponding industry in the United States. This assumes that the U.S.
shares by industry have less distortion compared to Colombia. In the main results we do not use
Colombian shares because we need to separately identify the average capital distortion from the capital production elasticity by industry. We assume that the capital and labor shares differ by industry but not by plant. The capital share is calculated using information from the NBER-CES Table A1 .
We use the wage bill as labor input, which implies that w=1. We rescale the labor compensation and capital stock by to take into account rents. We use
In the data we do not observe , so we normalize , = 1. This normalization does not affect the results. The marginal revenue products are affected by capital and output distortions in the following way:
, , ,
Substituting , and , in , we get the equation to estimate TFPR at the plant level.
We calculate TFPR at the industry level using the following equation:
where distortions at the industry level are computed using labor compensation, capital stock and value added at the industry level. 
Results
Descriptive Statistics
The last column of Table 1 Table 2 shows the number of firms that enter and exit the panel over time, with the last column indicating the net entry. We define entry as a firm that appears in the dataset and is not observed in the previous year. Exit corresponds to a firm previously observed that is not observed the next year in the dataset. Net entry is calculated as the difference between firms that enter in year t minus firms that exit in year t-1. Thus a particular firm can be counted both in the entry and the exit column (though not in the same year). On average 479 firms enter each year, while 594
exit. This corresponds to an average annual entry/exit rate of approximately 11 percent and 14 percent, respectively, of the plants observed in the panel.
As reported in the last column of Table 1 from year-to-year the number of plants declines slightly, with a more noticeable fall from 1991 to 92, likely due to a change in plant identifiers.
9
An additional explanation to the drop in number of firms is the aggregate economic cycle. Figure   1 reports the GDP growth rate and the net entry of firms. The values for this figure are taken from column (3) in Table 2 . The figure shows a strong correlation between the decline in GDP growth during the late 1980s with a decline in the net number of manufacturing firms getting started. 8 We also estimated the results including and adjustment to TFPQ, as defined This pattern is reversed when the economy recovers in the early 1990s, and on net there is a higher number of firms getting started. and 49 employees. However, plants with employee size ranging from 100 to 249 have the largest share of total employment (24 percent).
To illustrate how well the panel represents overall economic activity in Colombia, Figure   2 shows the distribution of labor force by economic activity. We define informal as people who are not affiliated to health insurance through employment. The figure uses data from the 1998
Colombian Household Survey. Among the categories depicted in the graph, only 1.5 percent of the labor force reports working in the manufacturing sector, and 54.6 percent work in firms with more than 10 employees. Since Colombia's labor force in 1998 was around 15.3M people, this would correspond to approximately 126,476 people in the manufacturing sector working in firms with more than 10 employees. This number is smaller than the number we have in our dataset of 293,108 employees. This could be due to the fact that the Colombian Household Survey includes information from only 13 municipalities, while the panel dataset is a census of all manufacturing firms with more than 10 employees.
Empirical Results
Figure 3 plots the distribution of the plant TFPQ relative to the industry TFPQ for 1998. It is calculated as , . This distribution is weighted by the value added share of the industry relative to the economy, divided by the number of firms in 1998 in a specific sector.
Colombia's TFPQ dispersion is wider than in the United States, China and India as reported by Hsieh and Klenow (2009) , and the left tail is thicker. The graph also shows lumps in the left tail, indicating the possibility of regulation that encourages firms to stay at a low level of productivity rather than expanding or exiting. and 1991 the distribution is fairly smooth and more compact. After 1993, the long left tail starts to emerge again, with a particularly noticeable lump in 1996 and 1998.
Panel A in Table 4 The first column of Table 5 shows that aggregate manufacturing TFP would increase by 47-55 percent with full liberalization.
Using Colombian output shares and equalizing Colombian labor shares within each manufacturing sector results in an average increase of approximately 80 percent, as shown in column (2). . The hypothetical distribution is more dispersed than the actual distribution. In particular it shows a larger concentration of firms in the left and right tails.
This indicates that there should be fewer mid-sized plants and more small and large ones. 10 This result-that the efficient distribution has a wider variance than the actual distribution-is consistent across years, as depicted in Figure 8 .
Column (1) in Table 7 
Robustness
In this section we provide robustness results to the estimates obtained. In particular we vary the elasticity of substitution and the source of output and labor shares. Columns (2)-(4) of Table 5 show robustness results for the proportion of TFP gains from equalizing TFPR across plants within industries. Column (2) uses Colombian labor and output shares, while column (3) uses U.S. shares for both. These results help assess the effects of industrial composition on measures of misallocation. Using Colombian labor and output shares increases the gains from equalizing TFPR within industries, while using U.S. labor and output shares results in more modest gains from equalizing TFPR within industries. In column (4) we increase the elasticity of substitution between plant value added from 3 to 5, finding an increase of 80 percent with full liberalization.
It is worth noting that Broda, Greenfield and Weinstein (2006) report estimates of the elasticity of substitution among different varieties of a good to be equal to 2.9 in Colombia.
In Table 7 column (2) we show the results for the proportion of TFP gains in Colombia relative to those in the United States. In 1997 increasing the elasticity of substitution between value added from 3 to 5. By increasing to 5 we find that manufacturing TFP in Colombia would range from -0.9 percent and 9.0 percent.
Assessment of Measurement Error
To explore the impact that classical measurement error in plant revenue and inputs may have in the Colombian estimates, we regress revenues on inputs as:
We also regress inputs on revenues as:
Each regression includes weights derived from the share of value added of the industry over the whole economy, divided by the number of firms in that specific year and sector. Results are reported in If, like Hsieh and Klenow, we assume that the serial correlation in measurement error for a given plant is lower than the true correlation for revenue and inputs, and that the true correlations are the same across countries, then we should find that the growth rates in revenue and inputs varies more in Colombian plants than in U.S. plants. In Table 9 we test whether growth rates of revenue and inputs vary more across plants in Colombia than in the United States.
First, we create the percentage growth of the firm value added, and the percentage growth of the sector value added. Then we compare the difference in variation of the firm with respect to the industry. This calculation is weighted by the share of value added of the industry over the whole economy, divided by the number of firms in that specific year and sector. 
Additional Results
In this section we show how TFPQ and TFPR dispersion relate to policy changes; and how it correlates to different firm and geographical characteristics. 1980s correspond to an increase in trade barriers (see Eslava et al., 2009; Esguerra and Villar, 2006; and Garay, 1998) . The 1991 reform corresponds to La Apertura, or the opening of the economy, which brought a rapid acceleration of tariff reductions and elimination of import licenses (Edwards, 2001) . After the passing of Law 50 we see an immediate decline in TFP dispersion, but the declining trend is reversed in 1991, the year when many of the trade liberalization reforms were passed. This upward trend in TFP dispersion continues after the passing of Law 100, which increased labor costs.
Next, we look at how the timing of the labor market, trade and financial reforms coincides with the changes in labor and capital over time. Table 10 shows the change for capital and labor across years. In the early 1980s during the period of high trade barriers, labor decreases. In the late 1980s and after the 1990 reform, which reduced dismissal costs, labor increases. After the 1993 reform, which increased employment contributions, labor grows at slower rates or even decreases.
Regressions using an indicator for the year of the reform and after are reported in Table   11 . For the regressions shown in Table 11 and in Table 12 the dependent variable is defined as the firm's log TFPR or TFPQ relative to the industry TFPR or TFPQ. Columns (1) of Table 11 show that firms that produce products for export are more productive, and that the opening of the economy in 1991 is associated with an increase in plant productivity levels for firms that export goods. Column 2 verifies that there is no increase in average productivity given the 1991 reform.
Column (3) control for the years in which the labor reforms were passed. The reform that reduced dismissal costs in 1990 is associated with an increase in productivity, while the reforms that increased labor costs in 1993 are associated with a decrease in plants' productivity.
In Column (1) of Table 12 we regress the sector TFPQ on an indicator of whether or not the firm produces products for export. The results shown in column (1) are positive and significant, indicating that firms that produce products for export are more productive than firms that do not. Column (2) shows that older firms are more productive than firms that are less than 6 years old (measured from the first time the firm appears in the panel dataset).
11 Column (3) indicates that productivity increases with firm size (measured by the number of employees).
Column (4) shows that, relative to the Atlantic region, firms in the Central region and in Bogotá are more productive, while firms in the Oriental region and in Orinoquía and Amazonía are less productive. 12 The last four columns of the table show the same results, but using TFPR instead of TFPQ. Firm size and whether or not the firm produces products for export have signs consistent with those reported for TFPQ, but not always significant values. The geographic indicators report that firms in Bogotá have higher TFPR values than the Atlantic region, while firms in Orinoquía and Amazonía regions have lower TFPR values. This could indicate that perhaps there is regional heterogeneity in barriers that prevent plants from increasing the marginal products of capital and labor. Table 13 shows the dispersion of distortions, measured as the standard deviation and . The mean value for the standard deviation for is 153, and the mean value for the standard deviation of is 0.78. Across the years, the standard deviation for the capital distortion ranges from 59 to 660, while the standard deviation for the output distortion ranges from 0.37 to 1.70. dispersion increases over time, and dispersion although declining on average, shows a sharp increase in 1993. This suggests that the increase in variability in TFPR in the 1990s, could be driven mostly from output distortions rather than capital distortions. Figure   11 shows a decline in the dispersion of and in the late 1980s and early 1990s, a period of reduction in trade barriers and labor market reforms; and a sharp increase after 1991 the year during which the opening of the economy legislation was passed. This upward trend in dispersion continues after the passing of Law 100, which increased labor costs.
Summary and Conclusion
In this paper we apply Hsieh and Klenow (2009) methodology to measuring misallocation and plant level manufacturing productivity in Colombia. We use a panel dataset with 74,392 plantyear observations for industrial establishment. The period that we study goes from 1982 to 1998.
We find that plants in Colombia have a wider TFPR dispersion than those in the United States, indicating greater misallocation of resources across plants.
We hypothetically reallocate resources by equalizing TFPR across plants and within industries. The aggregate TFP gains that would result are between 47-55 percent. We compare the actual firm sizes to the size observed if TFPR were equalized. We find that in Colombia there should be fewer mid-size plants and more small and large ones. In particular, we find that medium and large firms should increase their plant size. These results are consistent across years.
We also show results from a scenario where Colombia would move to U.S. efficiency. This reallocation would result in aggregate TFP gains between 3-8 percent. We test for the robustness of our results by changing the elasticity of substitution between plant value added and the source of the labor and output shares. We find that using Colombian labor and output shares increases the gains from equalizing TFPR within industries; while using U.S. labor and output shares reduces the gains from equalizing TFPR within industries.
To the extent that changes in productivity are due to different policies being implemented, we show how TFPQ and TFPR dispersion relate to labor market, trade and financial policy changes and firm characteristics. While there is no clear causal evidence that trade and labor market reforms directly affected plants' productivity, we see some indication of concurrent increases in productivity with reductions in dismissal costs, and of reductions in productivity with increases in health and pension contributions. Future work can focus on causal tests of how specific policies affected plants' productivity as well as aggregate productivity. 
